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Stat155 Game Theory - Homework 2: Auction, Allocation and Payment Rules

Single-Item AuctionsFirst-Price AuctionsSecond-Price AuctionsSponsored Search AuctionsAllocation and Payment RulesMyerson’s Lemma

Suppose a subset S of the bidders in a second-price single-item auction decide to collude, meaning that they submit their bids in a coordinated way to maximize the sum of their utilities.

Econ 104 Advanced Microeconomic Theory - Assignment 1: Choice Theory

UC BerkeleyEcon 104Advanced Microeconomic TheoryChoice Theory

The Associated Press constructs a weekly national ranking of the 25 best College Football Teams. This ranking is constructed by a survey completed by a “panel of 63 sports writers and broad- casters from around the country”, where each person submits their own ranking

STAT155 Game Theory - Homework 4: Simple Near-Optimal Auctions, Multi-Parameter Mechanism, Spectrum Auctions and Stable Matching

UC BerkeleySTAT155Game TheorySimple Near-Optimal AuctionsMulti-Parameter MechanismSpectrum Auctions

Consider a combinatorial auction in which bidders can submit multiple bids under different names, unbeknownst to the mechanism.

STAT155 Game Theory - Homework 5: Selfish Routing, the Price of Anarchy, Over-Provisioning and Atomic Selfish Routing

UC BerkeleySTAT155Game TheorySimple Near-Optimal AuctionsMulti-Parameter MechanismSpectrum Auctions

Prove that if C is the set of nonnegative, nondecreasing, and concave cost functions, then α(C)=43 .

ECON 601 - Microeconomics: Theory and Applications - Final Exam - Question 1: Games and game theory

University of San FranciscoEconomicsECON 601MicroeconomicsTheory and ApplicationsGame Theory

Suppose table A is the payoff matrix for the row player in a two-person symmetrical game. Indicate restrictions on the relative values of the payoffs in table A that would be sufficient to define the game as a Prisoner’s Dilemma

ECON 601 - Microeconomics: Theory and Applications - Final Exam - Question 2: Evolutionary dynamics

University of San FranciscoEconomicsECON 601MicroeconomicsTheory and ApplicationsEvolutionary dynamics

Suppose that two cultural groups, red and blue, have housing preferences that vary as a function of the fraction f ∈ [0,1] of red households in the neighborhood, with each group’s relative valuation / price being given

ECON 601 - Microeconomics: Theory and Applications - Final Exam - Question 3: Social Preferences

University of San FranciscoEconomicsECON 601MicroeconomicsTheory and ApplicationsSocial Preferences

A major theme of this class has been how social preferences influence behavior. Consider two students working on a joint project who care about both their own outcomes as well as the outcomes of students that they work with, such that for each individual i receiving payoffs πi while working with individual j receiving payoff πj

ECON 601 - Microeconomics: Theory and Applications - Final Exam - Question 4: Social coordination of public outcomes

University of San FranciscoEconomicsECON 601MicroeconomicsTheory and ApplicationsSocial coordination of public outcomes

Consider a classic tragedy of the fishers where two individuals’ actions have negative external effects on each other and also act as substitutes. Assume that individuals lower and Upper are maximizing utility functions

ECON 601 - Microeconomics: Theory and Applications - Final Exam - Question 5: Exchange under incomplete contracts

University of San FranciscoEconomicsECON 601MicroeconomicsTheory and ApplicationsExchange under incomplete contracts

Consider a situation where a Buyer seeks to purchase goods for resale from n small business Suppliers, but cannot contract on the quality q of the goods provided, and hence may only decide to terminate a relationship if quality is too low

ECON 601 - Microeconomics: Theory and Applications - Final Exam - Question 6: Applying theory

University of San FranciscoEconomicsECON 601MicroeconomicsTheory and ApplicationsApplying theory

Answer any one question that we have yet to solve in class or lab, other than the two short discussion questions 21 and 28, i.e., any one of problems 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22-27 and 29-37

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