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STAT155 Game Theory - Homework 5: Selfish Routing, the Price of Anarchy, Over-Provisioning and Atomic Selfish Routing
US UC Berkeley STAT155 Game Theory Simple Near-Optimal Auctions Multi-Parameter Mechanism Spectrum Auctions VCG mechanism Selfish Routing Over-Provisioning Price of Anarchy
Homework 5 Questions Exercise 11.2 (H) Prove that if C is the set of nonnegative, nondecreasing, and concave cost functions, then α ( C ) = 4 3 .
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Exercise 11.3 For a positive integer p , let C p denote the set of polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and degree at most p: C p = { ∑ i = 0 p a i x i : a 0 , . . . , a p ≥ 0 } .
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(a) Prove that the Pigou bound of the singleton set { x p } is increasing in p .
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(b) Prove that the Pigou bound of the set { a x i : a ≥ 0 , i ∈ { 0 , 1 , 2. . . , p } } is the same as that of the set{ x p } .
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(c) (H) Prove that Pigou bound of C p is the same as that of the set{ x p } .
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Problem 11.2 In this problem we consider an alternative objective function, that of minimizing the maximum travel time
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? m a x P ∈ P : f p > 0 ? ∑ e ∈ P c e ( f e )
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of a flow f . The price of anarchy (POA) with respect to this objective is then defined as the ratio between the maximum cost of an equilibrium flow and that of a flow with minimum-possible maximum cost. We assume throughout this problem that there is one origin, one destination, one unit of traffic, and affine cost functions (of the form c e ( x ) = a e x + b e for a e , b e ≥ 0 ).
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(a) Prove that in networks with only two vertices o and d , and any number of parallel edges, the POA with respect to the maximum cost objective is 1.
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(b) (H) Prove that the POA with respect to the maximum cost objective can be as large as 4 / 3 .
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(c) (H) Prove that the POA with respect to the maximum cost objective is never larger than 4 / 3 .
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Exercise 12.3 Prove that the following statement is equivalent to Theorem 12.1: If f ∗ is a minimum-cost flow in a selfish routing network with cost functions c and f is an equilibrium flow in the same network with cost functions c ̃ , where c ̃ ( x ) is defined as c e ( x / 2 ) / 2 , then
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C ~ ( f ) ≤ C ( f ∗ )
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The notation C ~ and C refers to the cost of a flow (11.3) with the cost functions c ~ and c , respectively.
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