CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 3: Myerson’s Lemma - Welfare Maximization

The key difference between optimization and mechanism design problems is that in mechanism design problems the constants (e.g., vi and wi) are not assumed to be known to the center / optimizer; on the contrary, they must be elicted, after which the optimization problem can then be solved as usual.

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 2: Introduction to Auctions

Alice and Bob devise a plan to steal the jade monkey before the next full moon. They realize that it’s in a glove compartment, and decide to use a 3d-printed key to break in. However, Alice forgets to bring the key, so the pair gets caught and put into jail.

COMP3477 Algorithmic Game theory - Summative Assignment: Nash Equilibrium, Strategies and Payoffs

Exercise 1. A set Nof|N|=nneighbours decide simultaneously and independently from each other, on hand whether to build an extension to their home without getting proper planning permission, and on the other hand which of their neighbours to notify the local authority’s planning department about

Economics 482 Game Theory and Economics - Problem Set 4 : Nash equilibrium

Consider the following Bertrand game between two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. As in the standard Bertrand game, each firm’s action is a choice of price (that is, some nonnegative real number).

STAT155 Game Theory - Homework 5: Selfish Routing, the Price of Anarchy, Over-Provisioning and Atomic Selfish Routing

Prove that if C is the set of nonnegative, nondecreasing, and concave cost functions, then α(C)=43 .

ETH Zu ̈rich Algorithmic Game Theory - Exercise Set 3: Nash equilibria and Congestion Game

In this exercise, we adapt the definition of Price of Anarchy for cost-minimization games, to games with positive utilities in the natural way.

COMP6207 Algorithmic Game Theory - Coursework 3: Gale-Shaply Algorithm and Stable Matching Problem

Suppose the preferences of men and women are given by the following tables, in which 1 is their most preferred partner and 5 is their least preferred partner. Find a stable matching using the Gale-Shapley algorithm with men making proposals.

Stat155 Game Theory - Homework 1: Incentive Problems, Nash equilibrium and Auctions

Suppose there are k identical copies of an item and n > k bidders. Suppose also that each bidder can receive at most one item. What is the analog of the second-price auction? Prove that your auction is DSIC.

Stat155 Game Theory - 2022 Fall - Homework 3: Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Revenue Maximizing

Continuing the previous exercise, restrict now to feasible sets X that contain only 0-1 vectors—that is, each bidder either wins or loses. We can identify each feasible outcome with a “feasible set” of bidders (the winners).

[2021] Economics 482 Game Theory and Economics - Midterm Exam - Q3 Hotelling Game Nash Equilibrium

This question is part of the Economics 482 Game Theory and Economics, midterm exam 2021 Spring, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. Hotelling Game