CourseNana | Game Theory - 博弈论

Homepage
Subject
Game Theory - 博弈论

Economics 482 Game Theory and Economics - Problem Set 3 : Nash equilibrium Pure Strategies

Rutgers UniversityEconomics 482Game Theory and EconomicsDominant StrategyNash Equilibrium

There is a town with 99 residents. The residents must decide individually and simultaneously whether to spend time lobbying the local government for better trash collection.

Economics 482 Game Theory and Economics - Problem Set 4 : Nash equilibrium

Rutgers UniversityEconomics 482Game Theory and EconomicsDominant StrategyNash EquilibriumPure Strategies

Consider the following Bertrand game between two firms, firm 1 and firm 2. As in the standard Bertrand game, each firm’s action is a choice of price (that is, some nonnegative real number).

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 1: Nash equilibrium

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game TheoryNash equilibriumPure Strategy

In the game rock-paper-scissors, two players simultaneously se- lect one of three possible actions: rock, paper, or scissors. You might recall from your childhood, or The Simpsons, that rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 2: Introduction to Auctions

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game TheoryIntroduction to AuctionsBayesian Prisoners’ Dilemma

Alice and Bob devise a plan to steal the jade monkey before the next full moon. They realize that it’s in a glove compartment, and decide to use a 3d-printed key to break in. However, Alice forgets to bring the key, so the pair gets caught and put into jail.

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 3: Myerson’s Lemma - Welfare Maximization

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game TheorySocial WelfareMyersons lemma

The key difference between optimization and mechanism design problems is that in mechanism design problems the constants (e.g., vi and wi) are not assumed to be known to the center / optimizer; on the contrary, they must be elicted, after which the optimization problem can then be solved as usual.

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 4: Myerson’s Theorem - Revenue Maximization

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game TheorySocial WelfareSponsored Search Aucktion

Recall the Bayesian (i.e., interim) formulation of the auction design problem from Homework 4. Since the interim constraints are weaker than the ex-post constraints presented in lecture, you might imagine that the welfare achieved by the welfare-maximizing auction in the interim case exceeds that of the ex-post case

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 5: Posted-Price Mechanisms

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game TheorySocial WelfareSponsored Search Aucktion

Bids are collected. A reserve price is chosen by removing an arbitrary bidder j from the auction, and setting the reserve price to be j’s bid. The auctioneer then allocates the good to the bidder with the highest bid iff their bid is at least this reserve, and charges the winner, if any, the greater of the second-highest bid and the reserve price.

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 6: Approximation Mechanisms

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game Theory Equal-Revenue DistributionApproximation Mechanisms

Recall the game that motivated the Prophet Inequality: Assume n independent random variables π with non-negative, continuous distributions Gi. The distributions Gi are known in advance, but the “prize” πi is not revealed until period i.

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 7: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game Theory Equal-Revenue DistributionVickrey Auction

Consider a single-good auction, and assume bidders’ values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution F. Prove that the expected revenue of the Vickrey auction (second-price without a reserve) with n bidders,

CSCI 1440/2440 Introduction to Game Theory - Homework 8: EPIC Auctions

USCSCI 1440CSCI 2440Introduction to Game Theory Equal-Revenue DistributionEnglish Auctions

This problem concerns Japanese auctions, a variant of the classic English auction that poses demand queries rather than value queries, and that forbids bidders from re-entering after exiting (i.e., skipping even one round of bidding in) the auction.

2

博弈论代写,Game Theory代写,博弈论代编,Game Theory代编,博弈论代考,Game Theory代考,博弈论help,Game Theoryhelp,博弈论作业代写,Game Theory作业代写,博弈论编程代写,Game Theory编程代写,博弈论programming help,Game Theoryprogramming help,博弈论assignment help,Game Theoryassignment help,博弈论solution,Game Theorysolution,

Payment

Scan Our QR Code

Wechat

WeChat (微信)

WhatsApp

Join Us

Send Mail